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ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC
SECTOR BARGAINING UNIT
Andria S. Knapp*
A Speech before the First Ohio Public Sector Labor Law Colloquium, Case Western
Reserve Law School, Cleveland Ohio, April 1, 1985
INTRODUCTION
DISCUSSING BARGAINING UNITS in public sector labor re-
lations is largely a matter of perspective, or, more specifically,
which side of the bargaining table you sit on. I am reminded of the
parable of a group of blind men who tried to describe an elephant
they had bumped into in the jungle. The blind man who had
touched the elephant's trunk said, "It's a kind of snake!" Another
had grabbed the animal's massive leg: "No, it's like a tree." Yet
another had felt its thin, leathery ear and concluded that the ele-
phant was an exotic plant with massive leaves. A fourth had
brushed against its side and decided that it was a mountain. And so
it goes with public sector bargaining unit determinations: your view
of them depends on your position relative to the beast of collective
bargaining and your particular blind spots. For a public employer,
the problem is how to coordinate bargaining units so as to have the
fewest number of bargaining sessions to attend and agreements to
administer, all in the context of the political ramifications of bar-
gaining results; public employees are concerned about effective rep-
resentation in line with their specific occupational, geographic and
political interests; and the general public doesn't really stop to think
about the matter much until a strike becomes imminent, hoping in
the meantime in a vague sort of way that there will be no intrusion
on the continued delivery of public goods and services. Like many
other issues in state or local government administration, public sec-
tor labor relations becomes a matter of concern to the person on the
street when the system breaks down rather than when it works
smoothly.
* The Author is a labor arbitrator in San Francisco and is an adjunct faculty member
at Hastings College of Law.
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The efficient functioning of any public sector collective bargain-
ing system depends, however, in part on the rational basis of its
underlying structure, and that is where the determination of a bar-
gaining unit plays an important role in developing and maintaining
effective labor relations.1 A bargaining unit is simply a grouping of
employees who are required by a unit determination from the state
labor relations board to vote together in a union election and, if the
union is successful, to bargain as a unit with the employer.2 Thus,
unit determinations shape the negotiations, strikes, impasse resolu-
tion schemes, and contract administration problems which follow
election and certification of the union. My presentation today will
address, first, general bargaining unit dynamics applicable to all
public sector unit determinations; 3 second, principles of unit deter-
mination established in the Ohio legislation;4 and third, problems
which are likely to arise from that legislation, with some observa-
tions on solutions to similar problems which have been adopted in
other jurisdictions, in the hope that they may be useful to you here
in Ohio as you flesh out the skeletal structure of public sector col-
lective bargaining enacted by the state legislature.'
I. THE DYNAMICS OF BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATIONS
While public sector labor relations differ substantially from pri-
vate collective bargaining in some important respects, there are a
few basic and universal principles of bargaining unit dynamics
which cut across the public-private distinction and are a good place
to start talking about bargaining units and how to structure them.6
1. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.05-.06 (Page 1984). Under § 9(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1982)), the National Labor Relations Board is empowered to decide what consti-
tutes an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. See infra note 30;
APPROPRIATE UNrrS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (P. Nash & G. Blake eds. 1979).
2. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page 1984). For articles discussing the
Ohio act specifically, see Student Project Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio: Before
and After Senate Bill No. 133, 17 AKRON L. REv. 299 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Student
Project]; Comment, Public Employee Collective Bargaining Becomes a Matter of Right in
Ohio, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 219 (1983); White, Kaplan & Hawkins, Ohio's Public Employee
Bargaining Law: Can It Withstand Constitutional Challenge?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
3. See infra notes 6-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 35-93 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
6. There are several classic discussions of bargaining unit determinations in public sec-
tor collective bargaining. See Shaw & Clark, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units
in the Public Sector: Legal and Practical Problems, 51 OR. L. REv. 151 (1971); Rock, The
4ppropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1001 (1969); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE
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All subsequent consideration of bargaining unit determinations
must take into account one initial and essential question: what is
the goal of the process of making unit determinations? The answer
depends on the perceived consequences. What purposes are served
by a unit determination? Why not simply let employees make their
own choices about who they want to associate with for representa-
tion purposes? Is there such a thing as an optimal unit size? It is
important to understand that unit determination decisions may
have contradictory implications for the different parties involved in
the bargaining process: the employer, the employees, the union,
and, in the public sector, the taxpaying public or alternatively, the
public interest.7
Most obviously and directly, the unit designation determines
both the size and strength of the union, which in turn dictate the
power structure of bargaining, as well as what issues will be ad-
dressed by the union in negotiations. The larger the union, the
more bargaining power it generally has, and the more essential the
employees in a specific unit are to the employer's ability to accom-
plish its purposes, the more power their unit has.' The interests of
LJ. 1156 (1974); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE Crrms (1971). See
also, Mack, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Diffusion of Managerial Structure and Frag-
mentation ofBargaining Units, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 281 (1974); Comment, Bargaining Units
for State and Local Employees, 39 Mo. L. REv. 187 (1974); Moore & Chiodoni, Unit Deter-
mination Criteria in Public Sector Employment Relations, 8 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
235 (1979); Rubin, Hickman, Durkee & Hayford, Public Sector Unit Determination, Adminis-
trative Procedures and Case Law, Final Report submitted to U.S. Dept. of Labor, Labor-
Management Services Administration, May 31, 1978, at 405; Unit Determination, Recogni-
tion, and Representation Elections in Public Agencies, Proceedings of a Conference on Public
Sector Labor Management Relations, 1971 (U. of Cal. Inst. of Indus. Rel. 1972). For experi-
ence in specific states, see, NAJrTA & TANIMOTO, GUME To STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1981) (Indus. Rel. Center, U. of Hawaii); Mc-
Hugh, The Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 1974-1978: Bell-
wether for the South, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 263, 302-06 (1978); W. NEWHOUSE, PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 256 (1978); Dayal, Faculty Union-
ism and Bargaining Unit Attitudes and Perceptions: A Case Study of Central Michigan Uni-
versity, 33 LABOR LJ. 554 (1982); Comment, Determination of the Bargaining Unit Under the
New Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act, 75 DICKINSON L. REV. 490 (1971). For a
recent discussion on bargaining units in the private sector, see Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units,
70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984); much of the analysis is pertinent to public sector bargaining units
as well.
7. Politics plays a powerful role in public sector collective bargaining, and "the public
interest" is often recited as a magic incantation by courts and state labor relations boards to
justify arguably subjective decisionmaking in cases involving the classic "balancing" of inter-
ests. For a discussion of political process in public sector bargaining, see Summers, supra
note 6.
8. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 6 at 97-98, 104-14. Leslie, supra
note 6, at 357, refers explicitly to the power to strike, which is often limited or forbidden in
the public sector. Public employee bargaining units may derive part of their bargaining
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the employees included in any unit will determine what the union
wants to bargain with the employer about. Thus, both the number
and the occupational composition of employees in the unit are
important.9
Deciding who is in a particular bargaining unit necessarily also
determines who is out of the unit, or, to put it another way, who is
excluded from representation.° The bargaining unit determination
directly affects the ability of various employee groups to have mean-
ingful input into decisions made about the terms of their employ-
ment.11 For some employees, being excluded from one bargaining
unit has no real impact; they will simply join forces to form another
unit. For other employees, however, exclusion from a particular
bargaining unit is tantamount to exclusion from representation alto-
gether. This happens when the excluded employees lack sufficient
power to form an effective alternative bargaining unit, either be-
cause there are too few of them to constitute an attractive and eco-
nomically viable unit to affiliate with a larger international union, or
because their importance to the organization is minimal.12
The unit decision also determines the extent to which special
interests or needs of various employee groups are considered and
met, and in what context. Large units will be made up of a number
of smaller interest groups; as the exclusive bargaining representative
power from their ability to strike, but the power also derives from other sources, e.g., political
influence, ability to affect productivity through influence on employee attitudes about work,
ability to force the employer to participate in an impasse resolution scheme such as binding
interest arbitration.
9. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 6; Leslie, supra note 6. Several
empirical studies have attempted to verify this intuitively obvious assertion by measuring the
impact of bargaining unit determinations on different aspects of the bargaining relationship,
with mixed results. See Perry & Angle, Bargaining Unit Structure and Organizational Out-
comes, 20 INDUS. REL. 47 (1981).
10. Some employees will be excluded from representation altogether because they are
not employees covered by the collective bargaining statute. Others will simply be excluded
from being represented by a particular union local; they will retain the right to form their
own appropriate unit.
11. This problem is not limited solely to employees who are excluded from a particular
unit. The selected majority representative has a duty of fair representation in contract negoti-
ation and administration which extends to all members of the bargaining unit. See OHIsO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(B)(6) (Page 1984); 2 C. MoRsIS, Ti DEVELOPING LABOR
LAw 1285-358 (2d ed. 1983). Generally, the principle of majority rule and the realities of
accommodating the various interest groups represented by a union mean that the relative size
of an interest group in a unit has a direct impact on how strongly the union will push for that
group's interests over those of other factions in the unit. The exception to this is where a
small group of employees has power which derives from its occupational position rather than
from its size.
12. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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of these special interest groups within the larger bargaining unit, the
union is charged with deciding what priorities to give to the com-
peting demands of the various groups at the bargaining table. 3 In
contrast, smaller bargaining units are usually composed of fewer
factious, resulting in more responsive representation by the union. 4
The competing interests of different employee groups still exist. In-
stead of being channelled and sorted out by the union, however,
these competing interests appear on the bargaining table before the
employer in the guise of different demands from different unions,
and the process of ordering priorities is undertaken with the em-
ployer's participation.
In addition to determining the issues to be presented at the bar-
gaining table, whose interests are best represented there, and the
relative strength of the union, the unit determination also affects the
general peacefulness and effectiveness of the bargaining relation-
ship, depending on a number of factors which are somewhat amor-
phous and difficult to pin down: the initial relationship between the
parties, the lines of communication which are established between
the employer and the union, what employee interest groups are in-
cluded in the bargaining unit, how effective the union is in manag-
ing intra-union conflict, and the importance to employees of
demands which are not met at the bargaining table, to name a few
outstanding examples.' 5 One of the most important functions a
union serves is as a channel of communication between the employ-
ees it represents and the employer. The parties' relationship and
their attitude toward each other will color the dialogue between
them, in particular the union's effectiveness as emissary to the em-
ployees from the employer and vice-versa.
Taking the various consequences of the bargaining unit determi-
nation into account, can one say that there is an optimal unit size?
Given the variety of employers, employees, occupational skills, fis-
cal limitations, and public choices about the level and kinds of serv-
ices to be provided by the government, I suspect probably not, at
least as a general rule. Again, the answer also depends to a large
13. The perennial problems associated with determining the extent of the duty of fair
representation are similar in the private and public sectors. See C. MoRRs, supra note 11,
1285-358; Summers, The Individual's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Consti-
tutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977).
14. At least, employees believe that the union is more responsive to their needs. Perry &
Angle, supra note 9.
15. See Moore & Chiodoni, supra note 6; Haskell, Centralization or Decentralization of
Bargaining Among State Government Employees An Examination of the Options, 10 J. COL-
LECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 19 (1981); Perry & Angle, supra note 9.
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extent on your perspective: the employees' interest in bargaining
(and thus in bargaining unit determinations) is quite different from
the employer's. Furthermore, both of their interests may be differ-
ent from those of the general public or the union as an entity with
institutional interests at least partially separate from those of the
employees in a specific workplace. Like Newton's Third Law of
Motion, which states that for every action, there is an equal and
opposite reaction, internal contradictions and tensions are present
in the principles which one can formulate for establishing optimal
bargaining units. Any attempt to reconcile these paradoxes will
stumble on the competing interests at stake.
Consider first the large bargaining unit. From the employer's
perspective, large units are generally preferable for a number of rea-
sons. Initially, the employer wants a unit which is too large for a
union to be able to organize effectively. Large bargaining units are
more difficult for unions to organize and the odds against the
union's winning a representation election are greater. Post-election
large units also mean, for the employer, greater coordination of
wage demands at the bargaining table, since the union and not the
employer is responsible for setting priorities among the interest
groups it represents. There is less opportunity for whipsawing
among competing bargaining units at the bargaining table, and uni-
formity of treatment among employees is easier to achieve. The
large unit also provides the advantages of simplified contract ad-
ministration, at least up to a point:16 small units can present admin-
istrative nightmares as an employer struggles to keep up with
different negotiating schedules, different sets of representatives to
deal with, and different dues checkoff provisions. Another result of
larger units is the possibility of improved coordination between col-
lective bargaining and the employer's and legislature's budgeting
process.
Large units are not an unmixed blessing for the employer, how-
ever. Once a union wins an election in a large unit, the unit has, by
virtue of sheer size, considerable bargaining power and greater lev-
erage against the employer at the bargaining table. 7 In addition,
the larger the unit, the greater is the possibility of internal strife
within the unit, which may lead to protracted and pointless negoti-
16. There seems to be some support for the proposition that there is such a thing as a
unit which is too large even from the employer's perspective. Moore, Kruger & Gilmore, A
Triple-Tier Collective Bargaining System for Productivity Improvement in Public Sector Em-
ployment Relations, 9 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 1 (1980).
17. Supra note 8.
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ating while the union attempts to please all of its constituents. Fi-
nally, the larger the unit, the more entrenched and resistant to
change it seems to become.'" It is likely to be more difficult for the
employer to engage in experimentation and innovation with respect
to either human resources management or new and different meth-
ods of production.' 9
The union, too, generally prefers a large unit to a small one,
because the large unit maximizes the union's power in the work-
place. A larger unit also permits greater bargaining coordination at
the level of the national or international union. Rather than having
to deal with several different affiliates at different times, the union
can conduct a single set of negotiations and take advantage of econ-
omies of scale in the negotiation process. Larger units spread the
cost of representation among more employees, thus lowering the
unit cost of representation to each employee.
As in the case of the employer, however, large units have their
disadvantages for unions as well. One is that the largest possible
unit may be one which the union cannot effectively organize. Dif-
ferent departments or groups of employees will have different levels
of interest in unionization. If the union opts to seek to represent the
largest possible unit, it risks losing the representation election and,
along with it, prestige, the resources expended on the campaign,
and the opportunity to organize a safer, smaller unit during the
election bar period, usually one year.20 The large unit also presents
the union with the hard task of pleasing, or at least placating, a
number of employee interest groups with different and often com-
peting concerns. Internal strife and suspicions of breach of duty of
fair representation may contribute to employee dissatisfaction and
dissension if certain groups feel their interests are being sacrificed
for the "greater" good of the group.2' Finally, at some point a unit
18. Newton's first law of motion states that a body, if left to itself, will maintain its
condition, either of rest or of motion, unchanged. This law of momentum and inertia appears
also to apply with equal force to collective bargaining relationships. Once a unit has been
established and the parties have begun the process of developing a bargaining relationship,
the employer as well as the union has an interest in maintaining the status quo rather than
investing more time and resources in developing a relationship with a new employee
representative.
19. Haskell, supra note 15; Moore, Kruger & Gilmore, supra note 16. The employer is
engaged in the act of producing public services rather than widgets or some other tangible
object. The need to experiment with improved methods of production remains the same,
however.
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(C)(6) (Page 1984).
21. The recent decision under the NLRA from the United States Supreme Court hold-
ing unions jointly liable with employers for damages arising from a breach of the duty of fair
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becomes too large to be viable: the costs of administration increase,
effective communication between the union and the employees it
represents becomes difficult, and the ideal of effective representation
becomes too attenuated to retain any meaningful content.
Relatively small units present a different host of advantages and
disadvantages. In large units, the individual interests of separate
employee factions tend to get lost in the shuffle of reconciling com-
peting claims on the union's representational resources. The
smaller the unit, the greater the homogeneity of interests among
employees and the better a job the union is likely to be able to do in
terms of responding to employee input. The small unit maximizes
individual input into bargaining and the entire process of represen-
tation. From the perspective of the individual employee, this is de-
sirable. From the union's point of view, smaller units are also easier
to organize initially.
Conversely, however, the smaller the unit, the less bargaining
power it is likely to have, except where it is comprised of skilled
employees essential to the normal operation of the enterprise who
have considerable bargaining power as a result of that status. A
related problem is that the organizational level at which the em-
ployer conducts negotiations is usually comparable to the level of
the bargaining unit, and with smaller units, problems with a lack of
authority to negotiate a binding agreement may arise on the em-
ployer's side of the bargaining table.2 The tradeoff for employees,
then, is between larger and more powerful but less responsive units,
or smaller units with more personalized representation but com-
mensurately weaker bargaining strength.
From the employer's perspective, smaller units also have advan-
tages and disadvantages, although whether any particular attribute
of a small unit is considered an advantage or a disadvantage may
depend on whether you consult a central bargaining authority, like
the state Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB), or a department
manager. One disadvantage for the central bargaining authority is
that uniformity of treatment across occupational lines may be more
difficult to achieve with small units. At the same time, department-
sized units yield increased benefits from greater flexibility to re-
spond to department-specific issues and from decisionmaking di-
rected at addressing local issues without competition from other
representation will probably result in somewhat closer scrutiny and more careful treatment
by unions of employee complaints than in the past. See Bowen v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
22. Moore & Chiodoni, supra note 6.
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interest groups. The employer must also realize, especially at the
initial stages of unionization,2 3 that once bargaining units are estab-
lished and negotiating lines drawn, separate unions are loathe to
give up their individual negotiating autonomy. Thus it will be very
difficult to consolidate units later on. History and expectations are
powerful forces in shaping the parties' approach to bargaining unit
determinations.
One last consideration about the size of bargaining units relates
to the issues of bargaining power mentioned earlier. In the private
sector, bargaining power is directly related to strike power. In the
public sector, the right to strike is limited,24 but to the extent that
some right to strike is given to public employees, the private sector
experience is relevant. A large unit's greater bargaining power is
usually directly related to its power to threaten to strike effectively.
That power does not derive equally from all employee groups in the
unit, however; some groups have relatively little strike power and
their inclusion in the bargaining unit does not contribute to its bar-
gaining power. These subgroups of the larger unit could be sepa-
rated into distinct smaller units. Relatively weak smaller units
benefit from being included in a large unit with stronger subgroups
which do have strike capability. Stronger units, however, find their
bargaining power diluted by being included in a large unit with
weaker subgroups because of the difficulty of coordinating different
interest groups and different goals. This same problem exists with a
number of small units where the employer engages in multiunit
bargaining.
25
In addition to considerations of size, the composition of a bar-
gaining unit is also important. The operative concept behind all
bargaining unit determinations is that the employees in a single unit
must have an identifiable "community of interest." 26 Unlike most
European models of labor relations, in which employees are permit-
ted to join any union they desire without regard to occupational
23. In Ohio, there was de facto organization prior to the enactment of the statute, so it
may be inaccurate to say that Ohio public sector employers and unions are at the "initial
stages of unionization." The point about unions desiring to retain their individual negotiating
autonomy remains valid, however. See infra, notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
24. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(2) (Page 1984).
25. See Leslie, supra note 6, at 414-18.
26. The phrase "community of interest," which derives from private sector regulation, is
not found in the language of the NLRA. Rather it is an administratively developed rule used
to ensure that the union is composed of only those employees having similar interests and
working conditions. See, eg., Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962); Olin-
kraft, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 414 (1969); Kennecott Cooper Corp., 176 N.L.R.B. 96 (1969).
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affiliation,27 the unit model developed by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) and adopted by virtually every state which has
enacted a public sector collective bargaining statute categorizes em-
ployees into units of workers with similar bargaining interests: usu-
ally according to broad occupational groupings,2" further refined by
similarity in terms and conditions of employment.2 9 Under the
NLRA, a bargaining unit need not be the most appropriate possible
unit of any group of employees within a workplace; it must only be
an appropriate unit.30
In the public sector, additional considerations enter into optimal
unit determination theory. The most important of these is the rec-
ognition that the basic structure of public employment involves es-
sentially a single employer-one state, one city, one school
district-pitted against a potentially large number of bargaining
units, all competing vigorously for the lion's share of the employer's
financial and administrative resources. To protect the employer
from its own inability to say "no" to everyone, a number of states
have attempted to deal with the problem by banning the sin of
"overfragmentation" (also known as "undue unit proliferation"), 31
and sanctioning what are called "wall-to-wall units",32 which lump
employees into a relatively small number of very large "appropri-
ate" units-as many as 40,000-50,000 employees in a unit is not
uncommon. 33 This is most frequently seen at the state rather than
27. See, Aaron, Labor Relations Law in the United States from a Comparative Perspec-
tive, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1197, 1252-53 (1982).
28. For example, production employees versus administrative and clerical workers.
29. For example, the physical plant or geographic location.
30. See Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 909 (1950).
31. The use of overfragmentation as a criterion in determining the appropriate bargain-
ing units for (at least some) government employees is found in several state public employee
bargaining laws. E.g., Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.090 (1984); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 5-275(b)(1)(ii) (1982); Indiana, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-10(a)(2)('ii) (1984); Kan-
sas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 754327(e)(5) (Supp. 1983); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 979-E2 (1980); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 923.213 (Callaghan 1979); Pennsylvania,
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.604(i) (Purdon 1979); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 11 l.70(d)(2a) (West 1982). One state, Illinois, has provided for consideration of overfrag-
mentation in bargaining unit determinations but has prohibited the use of this factor as the
"sole or predominant" one in determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit. IMl.
PLRA § 9(b), Public Act 83-1012, Laws 1983, effective July 1, 1984.
32. In State of New York, 1 PERB 399.85 (1968), the New York Public Employment
Relations Board established five statewide units composed of various types of government
employees in the face of union objections that the employees should be allowed to form or
join 25 separate unions.
33. For example, the agreement between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
AFSCME covers approximately 60,000 employees. GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 81.1401 (BNA
1984). Haskell notes that as of 1981, New York has 10 units covering 160,000 employees and
404 [Vol 35:395
ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING UNIT
local level. Clearly, in units of that size, the principle of "commu-
nity of interest" becomes a mere shadow of its original self. The
balance struck initially by the State Employment Relations Board
(SERB or Board) in retaining community of interest as a meaning-
ful concept while ensuring administrative feasibility is perhaps the
single most important policy decision made on bargaining units by
the SERB, as it sets the unit pattern for all subsequent collective
bargaining issues.
Regarding the appropriate composition of public sector bargain-
ing units, at least at a state-wide level, a distinction is usually drawn
between occupational groupings which cut across departmental
lines ("horizontal" units) and departmental groupings which ignore
occupational interests in favor of encouraging departmental cohe-
siveness ("vertical" units). What little research has been done in
this area"4 indicates that departmental units are more desirable with
respect to productivity, since they permit bargaining with a focus on
performance requirements associated with specific departmental
objectives. At the same time, departmental bargaining is more flexi-
ble and more responsive in accomplishing the government's produc-
tion goals, and more responsive to employee interests as well.
Departmental units are most often the employees' unit of choice;
horizontal units are artificial from the employees' point of view-a
clerk at the Cincinnati Welfare Department feels a stronger bond
with a maintenance worker there than with a clerk at the Columbus
Parks and Recreation Department, despite their occupational iden-
tity. While some conditions of employment are best handled by
centralized bargaining, others are better negotiated locally: work
assignments and scheduling, departmental performance standards,
and working conditions. From the employer's point of view, how-
ever, horizontal units are superior to departmental units for pur-
poses of both negotiating and administering collective bargaining
agreements. Furthermore, there is a need for centralized bargaining
on some important issues, like pensions and insurance programs.
Basic compensation rates and fringe benefits within an occupational
category should be similar across departmental lines. Finally, cen-
tralized bargaining provides a vehicle for jurisdiction-wide policy
discussion and decisionmaking.
New Jersey 11 units encompassing more than 50,000 employees. Haskell, supra note 15, at
20.
34. Even the social scientists who research in the field have commented on the lack of
empirical data examining the true impact of bargaining unit determinations on collective
bargaining. Haskell, supra note 15, at 27.
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The Ohio SERB has recently authorized twelve statewide, hori-
zontal units pursuant to hearings held late last year. While this
may be desirable from the perspective of the new state Office of
Collective Bargaining, the OCB should not overlook the desirability
of permitting-indeed encouraging-local bargaining at the depart-
mental level. In this fashion, the benefits of both horizontal and
vertical unit configurations can be realized. The OCB cannot be all
things to all bargaining parties. It should recognize that fact of life
and permit various departments considerable latitude in participat-
ing in the bargaining process. Such a policy is likely to result in
more constructive labor relations, as departmental managers feel
their interests are being considered and employees see that their
natural community of interest, the department level, is not being
ignored.
With that review of general principles by way of background, let
us turn now to a consideration of the specifics of the Ohio
legislation.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OHIO ACT
Every state which passes a public sector collective bargaining
law determines for itself to what extent its legislation will parallel
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the basic model of col-
lective bargaining in the United States. While there are some obvi-
ous differences in private and public sector labor relations-right to
strike, impasse resolution schemes, and scope of the duty to bar-
gain, to name a few-every state has used the basic structure of the
NLRA as the jumping-off point for establishing the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively in the public sector.35 The Ohio Public
35. Forty states have collective bargaining statutes governing some aspect of collective
bargaining for public employees. However, not all of the statutes deal comprehensively with
all government employees. California, for example, has separate statutes regulating each of
the following employee groups: (1) state civil service employees and certain teachers,
(2) state noncivil service employees, (3) local government employees and (4) employees of the
University of California, Hastings College of Law, and California State University and Col-
lege. Some of the state statutes (Idaho and Indiana, for example) confer bargaining rights on
teachers while others regulate state but not local or municipal workers.
Twenty-four of the 40 states that do have collective bargaining statutes for public employ-
ees have provided comprehensive coverage under one statute for all public employees.
The 10 states that do not have collective bargaining statutes are: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West
Virginia. See GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. REP. MAN. (BNA 1984). Four of these, however,
have the functional equivalent of a collective bargaining statute for public employees. Utah
has such a statute covering firefighters only. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-1 (Supp. 1953).
Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina have statutes simila to a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Eg., S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-310 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1976).
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Employees' Collective Bargaining Act (Act)36 is no exception, espe-
cially with respect to bargaining unit determinations.
There are three usual sources of limitation on how employees
may be grouped into a single bargaining unit: the statutory defini-
tion of employees covered by the Act, direct statutory regulation of
bargaining unit groupings, and the more indirect but equally potent
application by the state labor relations board of discretionary statu-
tory standards to be applied in making bargaining unit determina-
tions. Again, the Ohio statute is no exception to this general
approach.
First, the statute excludes certain employees from its coverage;37
that is, they are forbidden from joining any union and engaging in
collective bargaining at all. Thus, they may not be included in any
bargaining unit. Second, the statute imposes limits on which cov-
ered employees may be included within the same bargaining unit;3"
inherent conflicts of interest are perceived to exist when certain
types of employees are in the same bargaining unit. The prototypi-
cal example of this situation is where guards or other security per-
sonnel who would be needed to maintain order in the event of labor
unrest are forbidden from being in the same bargaining unit with
rank-and-file employees. Third, the statute lists a number of crite-
ria for the SERB to consider in making bargaining unit determina-
tions;39 these criteria are somewhat subjective in nature and require
the SERB to exercise its expert judgment in approving bargaining
units submitted by the parties.
A. Coverage of the Act: The Definition of "Public Employee"
The definitional exclusions in the Ohio statute are found in an
exceptions clause at the end of section 4117.01(C), which defines
"public employee." Some of these exclusions are directly patterned
on the NLRB: confidential employees are excepted from the Act's
coverage,' as are management level employees and supervisors.4 '
Consistent with private sector interpretations of these definitions,42
36. 1983 Ohio Laws 140 (codified at O.R.C. ch. 4117 (Page 1984) (amending O.R.C. ch.
4117 (1953))).
37. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)1)-(14) (Page 1984).
38. Id. § 4117.06(I)0)-(6 ) .
39. Id § 4117.06(B).
40. Confidential employees are defined in O1o REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(J) (Page
1984).
41. Id. § 4117.01(C)(7), (10).
42. Id § 4117.01(J). In the private sector, the NLRB has excluded from bargaining
those employees satisfying the Board's so-called "labor-nexus" test. See NLRB v. Hendricks
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confidential employees are defined as those who have some direct
connection in their work to the collective bargaining process.
Managerial employees are those who either formulate or implement
policy on the employer's behalf.43 In addition, the Ohio Act in-
cludes collective bargaining and personnel administration functions
in the definition of a management level employee.' The drafters of
the legislation also acted to avoid interpretation problems which
surfaced in the private sector45 by specifying that university faculty
members would not be considered management level employees
solely because of their participation, as individuals, on faculty com-
mittees which formulate academic or other institutional policies.'
Supervisors are not explicitly excluded from bargaining in the
NLRA; the prohibition on supervisors organizing was administra-
tively enacted. 7 The Ohio statute, recognizing the universal ac-
ceptance of this rule, has specifically forbidden supervisors from
organizing and has also incorporated four clarifying provisos: (1)
department chairmen in school districts shall not be considered su-
pervisors;" (2) only the chief of a police or fire department, or his
designated deputy, shall be considered a supervisor;' (3) at the uni-
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981). The exclusion is limited to
employees who, in the ordinary course of performing their jobs, have access to confidential
labor-relations information which may be material to the employer's possible bargaining posi-
tion in subsequent negotiations.
43. See Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(K) (Page 1984). Managerial employees are
not excluded from coverage under the NLRA by any express language, but rather by an
implied exception to the statute. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-90
(1974). The exception for managerial employees is determined by reference to the employee's
actual job responsibilities, authority, and relationship to management, rather than his job
title. See id at 294.
44. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(K) (Page 1984).
45. See, e-g., NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), in which the Court held
that full-time faculty members at a large university were all "managerial employees" by vir-
tue of the extent to which the faculty as a group played a role in such matters as hiring
decisions, curriculum, and the like.
46. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(3) (Page 1984). To date, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Yeshiva does not appear to have gained widespread acceptance in the public
sector. Only two public institution employers, the University of Alaska and Wichita State
University, have fied Yeshiva claims. In both cases the governing labor relations board re-
fused to extend Yeshiva to the public sector. See Douglas, Distinguishing Yeshiva: A Troub-
ling Task for the NLRB, 24 LAB. L.J. 104, 106-07 (1983).
47. Supervisors are excluded from coverage under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Technically, supervisors are not excluded from bargaining under the Wagner Act. In fact,
the Act allows a supervisor to become or remain a member of a labor organization. Id
§ 164(a). However, the employer of that supervisor cannot be compelled to deal with the
supervisor as an employee for purposes of collective bargaining.
48. Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(1) (Page 1984).
49. Id § 4117.01(F)(2).
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versity faculty level, only heads of departments or divisions shall be
considered supervisors;" and (4) only certain teachers will be con-
sidered supervisors."1 These clarifying provisos are enacted largely
to avoid disputes about the status of professional employees, the
ordinary performance of whose jobs often looks very similar to
what management or supervisors usually do.52
There are other specific exclusions from the statute which are
more directly related to the public nature of the employer. Elected
officials are excluded from coverage of the Act,5 3 as are employees
whose principal duties are directly related to either the legislative or
executive functions of government (that is, most political appoin-
tees).5 4 Similarly, employees of county boards of election are ex-
cepted from the Act's coverage.55 Also omitted from the Act's
coverage are employees of a public official who act in a fiduciary
capacity.5 6 What all of these exceptions have in common is a desire
to avoid any possible abuse or corruption of the governmental pro-
cess as a result of unionization. Unionized employees naturally
have interests adverse to their employer, which they attempt to re-
solve through collective bargaining; where that employer is the gov-
ernment, there is great sensitivity to the potential for conflict of
interest between the performance of one's duty as a public servant
and the desires, demands, or dictates of union membership.
Court employees and certain attorneys are not permitted to or-
ganize;57 police and fire department employees are,5" but with more
50. Id. § 4117.01(F)(3).
51. Id. § 4117.01(F)(4)(a), (b).
52. A professional employee is defined in the NLRA at 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982). Cf.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(1) (Page 1984).
Professional employees are permitted to bargain under the NLRA. See, ag., C.W. Post
Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). Employers who oppose the unionization of professionals,
however, have attempted to rely on the sometimes imperceptible line separating professional
employees, who may belong to a union, from managerial employees, who may not. Because
professionals are often engaged in work which is very close to being managerial in nature, the
issue then becomes one of deciding whether the employees in question are to be included as
professionals or excluded as managers.
In NLRB v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the Supreme Court decided that members of
the Yeshiva University faculty were managers and denied them coverage under the Act (or,
more precisely, the Board-created managerial exclusion). Yeshiva has been criticized for fail-
ing to appreciate "subtle gradations of authority" which if ignored might lead to the emascu-
lation of Board's policy of including professionals under the Act. See The Managerial Status
of Faculty Members Under the NLRA, 94 HARv. L. REv. 251, 256-61 (1980).
53. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(1) (Page 1984).
54. Id § 4117.01(C)(2)-(3).
55. Id. § 4117.01(C)(12).
56. Id § 4117.01(C)(9).
57. Id § 4117.01(C)(8).
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limited rights than nonpublic safety-related workers have.5 9 Specifi-
cally, police officers and fire fighters have no right to strike. These
limitations are imposed to maintain law and order, including the
continued functioning of the judicial system. The importance of en-
suring public safety is deemed to outweigh the interest these em-
ployees may have in organizing. Rules like these also reflect the
political realities of legislative decisionmaking, which include re-
specting a certain deference toward another branch of government
and avoiding unnecessary intrusions on its ftmctioning. 6°
The employment structure in higher education presents unique
issues which have been dealt with in the Ohio Act by omitting,
from the Act's coverage, students who are employed as graduate
teaching assistants, residents and interns, or who hold other part-
time jobs,61 as well as part-time faculty members.62 The treatment
of students parallels the private sector model, although residents
and interns have been granted full employee status under public sec-
tor bargaining statutes in other jurisdictions.63 Omitting part-time
faculty is simply a recognition that for many adjunct faculty-
such as practitioners who teach trial tactics at law schools-teach-
58. See generally id. § 4117.01(C) (police and fire employees not excepted from
coverage).
59. Compare id § 4117.14(D)() (police and fire employees must submit their bargaining
proposals to a conciliator) with (D)(2) (other employees may strike to gain concessions).
60. Public sector labor relations are rife with instances of wrangling among various
branches of government over who is really in charge of interpreting the law. See, eg., AP-
SCUF v. Commonwealth, 436 A.2d 1386 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations
Bd., 438 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Commw. 1982).
61. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(1) (Page 1984).
62. Id § 4116.01(C)(14).
63. In the private sector, the NLRB considers interns and residents to be students and
not employees covered by the NLRA. The treatment of residents and interns in the public
sector has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction with the various state courts and labor
relations boards considering a number of factors in deciding whether to include residents and
interns in a house staff bargaining unit. Those states that have included residents and interns
have searched for language in the legislative history that indicates what the legislature in-
tended by enacting a public employee bargaining law. The Nebraska Supreme Court in
House Offices Ass'n v. University of Nebraska Medical Center, 198 Neb. 677, 225 N.W.2d
258 (1977), inferred the legislature's intent to include residents and interns from the absence
of an express exclusion in the stated purpose of the Act. Another approach used by state
labor boards and courts is to examine, often exhaustively, the day-to-day duties of residents
and interns and decide whether the residents and interns are "primarily" students or employ-
ees. See Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. NERC, 204 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1976). Another
factor often focused on is whether the employment relationship is "continuous" or whether
employment is merely ancillary to furthering the educational goals of the residents and in-
terns. See Philadelphia Ass'n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 92
L.R.R.M. 3410 (1976).
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ing is not their primary employmentf"
There are a few other exemptions from the Act's coverage: sea-
sonal and casual employees;6" members of the militia while on ac-
tive duty;66 and employees of the SERB itself." Again, these
exceptions are made in order to avoid conflicts of interest which
could damage the proper functioning of government services. By
and large, the statutory exclusions from the Act's coverage are
unremarkable.
B. Statutory Limits on Bargaining Unit Composition
Where employees are not covered by the Act, the Board has no
discretion to include them in a particular bargaining unit, since it
has no jurisdiction to include them in any unit at all. Similarly, the
Board lacks discretion in cases where the statute explicitly prohibits
putting certain employees in the same bargaining unit.6 8 In looking
at the content of the section, again one notices a strong similarity to
both private sector precedents and treatment in other jurisdictions
which provide collective bargaining rights for public employees.
Section 4117.06(D)(1) specifies that professional and nonprofes-
sional employees shall not be included in a single unit unless a ma-
jority of both the professionals and the nonprofessionals, voting
separately, opt for inclusion in a "mixed" unit. There is a consen-
sus of opinion that professional and nonprofessional employees have
a sufficient divergence of interests in the workplace that it would be
inappropriate to group them in a single bargaining unit unless they
prefer that structure. The NLRA provides that only professional
employees have the right to opt out of a larger nonprofessional
unit.6 9 In the private sector, professional employees are in the mi-
nority in most workplaces, and the Congress which brought profes-
sional employees within the Act's coverage was concerned that the
interests of this distinct minority could get lost even without a
breach of the duty of fair representation in the negotiation and ad-
64. This ignores the problem of individuals who do depend on regular part-time teach-
ing as an important source of income and who have a continuing, long-term employment
relationship with the employer despite the part-time nature of their employment.
65. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(13) (Page 1984).
66. Id § 4117.01(C)(4).
67. Id § 4117.01(C)(5).
68. These limitations are found in id § 4117.06(D). Eg., id § 4117.06(D)l) (limiting
bargaining units from containing both professional and nonprofessional employees); see infra
notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
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ministration of a collective bargaining agreement.70 The Ohio stat-
ute is slightly different, requiring a majority vote from both the
professional and nonprofessional ranks. For public sector employ-
ees, that formulation is preferable: the proportion of professional
employees is much higher in the public sector, especially in fields
like education, so that the situation might be reversed, with nonpro-
fessional employees in danger of losing an effective voice in the rep-
resentation process. Requiring both professionals and
nonprofessionals to opt into a single mixed unit preserves autonomy
and maximum effective representation for both groups.71
The SERB is also forbidden by statute from combining guards
or other security personnel with nonsecurity personnel in the same
unit.72 This prohibition also has its roots in the private sector73 and
has been extended in numerous other jurisdictions for public sector
collective bargaining.' It was adopted to ensure that the employer
could maintain discipline in the workplace, should any labor unrest
occur. If guards were included in the same bargaining unit with
other employees, the employer would not be able to count on their
complete cooperation in keeping order during strike or picketing
activity which threatened to disrupt continuing operations.
The Ohio statute also mandates special restrictions on bargain-
ing unit composition in police or fire departments. The first is a
prohibition on mixed units of police or fire officers and nonofficers,
such as clerks or administrative aides, in the same workplace.75
This is done not so much in order to guarantee labor peace and the
maintenance of discipline during labor unrest as it is to avoid a po-
tentially powerful conflict of interest: nonpolice or fire employees
70. In the interests of assuring complete freedom of choice to employees who do
not wish to be represented collectively as well as those who do, [the Taft-Hartley
Amendments require] the Board . . . to give greater attention to the special
problems of craftsmen and professional employees in the determination of bargain-
ing units.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATV E HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 409 (1948).
71. Three other states' public employee bargaining statutes contain provisions requiring
express consent of both professionals and nonprofessionals to form a mixed unit: Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.307(4)(h) (1981); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.13(4) (West 1982);
New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:8 (11) (1983).
72. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(I))(2) (Page 1984).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982).
74. Eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(f(2) (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 93,
§ 1101.604(3). (Purdon Supp. 1984). See IND. CODE ANN. ch. 20, § 20-7.5-1-2(e) (1984) (ex-
cluding employees performing security work from the definition of "school employee" for
purposes of collective bargaining).
75. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(D)(3) (Page 1984).
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have a limited right to strike,76 which police and fire officers do not.
Putting the two groups in a single unit could subject police officers
or fire fighters to pressure to join in what is otherwise lawful strike
activity by their union brethren. The second special restriction on
police departments is that officers at the rank of sergeant and above
must organize in a separate unit from rank and file employees.77
The definitional section of the statute which provides that supervi-
sors may not organize also provides that only the chief of a police or
fire department, or his designated deputy, shall be deemed a super-
visor. These sections together mean that sergeants and lieutenants
may organize, but into separate units from the rest of the depart-
ment. This gives these officers, who actually have quasi-supervisory
status, a right to organize and bargain, albeit a limited one, by vir-
tue of the practical fact that very small units, which these sergeant
units would be in all but the largest cities in the state, are simply not
viable-they are too small to have any real bargaining power rela-
tive to the employer and too small to be of real interest as affiliates
to national unions like Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) or Ameri-
can Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees
(AFSCME).
Further limitations on the SERB's power to designate bargain-
ing units relate to institutions of higher education-no units of
more than one such institution and, within any single college or
university, no units which might interfere with accreditation stan-
dards are allowed;7  and to employees of elected county officials-
no bargaining units containing employees of more than one elected
county official are permitted, unless the elected officials and the
county board of commissioners agree to a larger unit.79
The last nondiscretionary constraint on bargaining unit determi-
nations is a grandfather clause which provides that the Board may
not certify (or the employer recognize) a union where there is a
contract or memorandum of understanding already in effect be-
tween the employer and another employee representative which has
been recognized by the employer or has traditionally represented its
employees.8 0 Thus, where the employer has in the past bargained
76. Certain classes of public employees, primarily police and firefighters, do not have the
right to strike. Id § 4117.14(D)(1). Other public employees, those not listed in that section,
do have a limited right to strike subject to fact-finding mediation, and 10-day written notice
of an intent to strike. Id § 4117(D)(2).
77. Id. § 4117.06(D)(6).
78. Id. § 4117.06(D)(4).
79. Id § 4117.06(D)(5).
80. Id § 4117.05(B).
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with some of its employees, there may be limits on its ability to
petition for a larger bargaining unit which would swallow up the
original group of workers.81 Given the extent of de facto bargaining
which existed in Ohio prior to the enactment of a de jure right to
bargain, this section is potentially a severe limitation on the SERB's
ability to shape bargaining units.82
C. Criteria for Discretionary Bargaining Unit Determinations
While the explicit limitations on bargaining unit composition
are numerous, there nonetheless remains after their application a
wide variety of possible unit configurations within the entire scope
of public employment. It is at this point that the SERB's exercise of
its discretion in approving bargaining units becomes critical in
shaping the direction of public sector bargaining.
When a union wants to represent some group of Ohio public
employees, it must be certified as their exclusive representative in
one of two ways, through a Board-conducted election or through
voluntary recognition."3 The election process is initiated when a
union or group of employees files a petition with the SERB alleging
a thirty percent showing of interest from employees in "an appro-
priate bargaining unit" and requesting an election.84 Alternatively,
a union may file a request for recognition directly with the em-
ployer, if it has support from a majority of employees, again, "in an
appropriate unit." Thus, the initial unit configuration is one pro-
posed by the union seeking representational status, rather than by
the Board itself. The Board is not necessarily required by the stat-
ute to accept passively any bargaining unit as proposed, however.
The statute seems to grant the SERB authority to take a more af-
firmative role in making unit determinations by stating that the
SERB "shall decide in each case the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. "85 There are also provisions in both
81. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
82. Bargaining prior to the enactment of the statute was apparently more concentrated
in certain sectors, such as public education, than others. Figures on the extent of organiza-
tion and bargaining prior to the statute are not generally available, but it has been estimated
that there are approximately 580,000 public employees subject to the statute. If only 10%
were bargaining previously, that means 58,000 employees grandfathered out of alternate unit
configurations. See Student Project, supra note 2, at 245.
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)() (Page 1984) (petition for election); id
§ 4117.05(A)(2) (voluntary recognition).
84. IM£ § 4117.07(A)(l). In addition, the employer may initiate an election by a petition
"alleging that one or more employee organizations has presented to it a claim to be recog-
nized ...." Id. § 4117.07(A)(2).
85. Id. § 4117.06(A).
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the election and recognition sections of the statute for challenges to
the proposed bargaining unit.86 The statute further provides:
The board shall determine the appropriateness of each bargain-
ing unit and shall consider among other relevant factors: the
desires of the employees; the community of interest; wages,
hours, and other working conditions of the public employees; the
effect of overfragmentation; the efficiency of operations of the
public employer; the administrative structure of the public em-
ployer; and the history of collective bargaining.87
Finally, the statute specifically states that: "The board may de-
termine a unit to be the appropriate unit in a particular case, even
though some other unit might also be appropriate,"88 which gives
the Board considerable latitude to approve or disapprove proposed
units.
The list of criteria is not unusual, nor is the lack of any guidance
in the statute for the Board to follow in applying the listed criteria.
What relative weight should be given to each of the six factors? Are
any of them more important than the others? The list of criteria is
internally inconsistent, taken as a whole: the desires of employees
and the history of collective bargaining would suggest small, depart-
mental units; the effect of overfragmentation and the administrative
structure of the public employer point to large horizontal units.
Other factors to be considered could point in either direction.
Wages, hours and other working conditions are related both to oc-
cupation and to department-specific conditions. As suggested
above,8 9 "community of interest" has, in public sector labor rela-
tions, become an elastic concept the internal content of which is
ambiguous and not particularly helpful in providing guidance for
unit determinations. Generally, the unit which the employees per-
ceive as congruent with their community of interest is too small a
unit for the employer's administrative convenience. In addition, the
standard of operational efficiency itself suggests smaller, departmen-
tal units for some purposes and larger, horizontal units for others,
namely, contract administration, at least up to a point.90
In other jurisdictions, different approaches have been taken to
bargaining unit determinations, although the Ohio formulation is
most typical. In Hawaii, for example, the statute itself specifies the
86. Id §§ 4117.07, 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(iv).
87. Id § 4117.06(B).
88. Id § 4117.06(C).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 6-34.
90. Haskell, supra note 15, at 29.
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permissible bargaining units.9 While different states have adopted
different standards, there has been a trend toward increasing use of
broad, horizontal units.92 However, even where wall-to-wall units
are most firmly entrenched, departmental units nonetheless con-
tinue to exist, illustrating the futility of attempting to adopt one
type unit to the exclusion of the other. Many state labor relations
boards have adopted a balancing test to evaluate the importance of
the statutory criteria;9 3 this approach promotes both flexibility and
considerable discretion on the part of the labor relations board in
response to different circumstances in different workplaces.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE OHio ACT
Despite the obvious care with which the Ohio legislation has
been drafted, there still remain areas of ambiguity and potential
trouble, some of which have been touched on above. This last sec-
tion will address other weaknesses in the statute, especially as they
relate to the principles of optimal unit configuration discussed in
Part I."4 There are three specific areas which should be addressed:
the role of the SERB in shaping unit determinations; 95 the treat-
ment of "misfit" employees whose employment situations do not fit
neatly into any of the categories prescribed by the statute;96 and the
finality of unit determinations made by the Board. 97
The two main criticisms which I have of the statutory scheme
may seem to be contradictory: the statute presents the possibility of
both too many units, and too few. In drafting the statute, the Ohio
legislature carefully crafted a number of exemptions from coverage
and prohibitions on unit configurations, and tied the whole package
up with a list of discretionary criteria for the Board to apply in
making unit determinations. Looking at the provisions of the stat-
ute as a whole, however, one has to ask how effective they will be in
accomplishing the unit determination goals espoused by the legisla-
ture in the regulatory scheme it has enacted. In making unit deter-
minations, the Board has both discretionary and mandatory
standards to apply. The Board's application of its discretionary
91. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1982).
92. Haskell, supra note 15, at 20.
93. See, eg., City of Appleton, Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, Decision
No. 7423 (1966); Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 30 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 613, 374 A.2d 761 (1977).
94. See supra notes 6-34 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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standards is what gives rise to the potential for too few units; the
mandatory criteria, which permit no deviance from their terms, cre-
ate the possibility of too many units.
A. The Role and Attitude of the Board: Discretionary Standards
of Unit Determination
The statute as drafted is quite comparable to many other state
public sector bargaining laws.9" It provides a certain amount of
guidance to the SERB and to the parties about what constitutes an
acceptable bargaining unit, yet it is ambiguous enough to permit the
SERB to exercise its judgment in many cases. This places a heavy
burden on the SERB; one key to the successful operation of the
statute is the role which the Board chooses to play in making unit
determinations. Through the flexible language of the discretionary
unit determination criteria listed in the statute, the Board has the
choice of adopting an activist stance in the formative stages of a
representation campaign or of electing a more passive, responsive
posture. While there is nothing inherently wrong with the Board's
merely accepting whatever units are proposed to it, it is absolutely
clear that such an approach, geared as it is primarily to the desires
of employees and their potential representatives, will almost surely
result in a larger number of units than the state legislature had in
mind when it included the overfragmentation criterion in the stat-
ute.99 The more active the Board is in supervising unit determina-
tions, the less likely it is that overfragmentation will occur.
At the same time, the Board must adopt a truly neutral posture
if it is to achieve a healthy balance between the various unit deter-
mination criteria specified in the statute. No one factor listed is
designated as more important than any other, so it would be inap-
propriate to place more emphasis on, say, overfragmentation than
on history of bargaining, community of interest, or any of the other
98. Although the same general themes appear throughout the various public sector col-
lective bargaining statutes, there are a number of variations on those themes, deriving princi-
pally from different viewpoints about the extent to which public employees should be granted
collective bargaining rights similar to those enjoyed by private sector employees. In many
respects, the public sector collective bargaining scene is like an experimental laboratory of
industrial relations, whose diverse approaches to regulating collective bargaining range from
more "liberal" statutes which most closely approximate the NLRA, ag., PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
34, §§ 213.1, 213.3 (Purdon 1984), to much more "conservative" laws which preserve a maxi-
mum of governmental control over the process of bargaining, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34:13B-2,-3 (West 1984), with an array of alternatives in between (with Ohio toward the
Pennsylvania end of the spectrum and New York leaning more toward the New Jersey
approach).
99. Perry & Angle, supra note 9, at 48.
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enumerated standards. The Board should be concerned about unit
proliferation, but not to the point of ignoring traditional criteria of
unit determination. The purpose of enacting a public sector collec-
tive bargaining statute is, after all, to give employees a more active
voice in determining their working conditions, which is best accom-
plished by effective representation focused on the specialized needs
of the group of employees included in the bargaining unit. The pur-
pose of the statute is not to force employees into artificial categories
which ignore occupational, departmental, geographical, or other af-
finities to ease the employer's transition into an era of collective bar-
gaining. Given the attention unit proliferation has received over the
years, the Board must be aware of its dangers. But the pendulum
can swing too far. Since the SERB itself is a government agency-
cum-employer,"° there may be a dangerous tendency to identify
too strongly and too sympathetically with other employers who
seek inappropriately broad bargaining units. The Board's willing-
ness to adopt an assertive posture in the recent statewide bargaining
unit determinations is a good sign, but that willingness to require
broad units must be tempered with a recognition of the limitations
of unit size. There is such a thing as a unit which is too broad; the
question is whether the SERB will recognize such a behemoth when
it sees one. The statute cautions against overfragmentation, not any
fragmentation at all.
One approach the Board could-and arguably should-adopt
would be to encourage the development of a two-tiered bargaining
structure, under which issues of broad concern were determined at
the state or citywide level, as appropriate, and issues more directly
related to the specific workplace would be negotiated at the "local"
level of the affected department or agency. Such an approach com-
bines the benefits of centralized bargaining with the refinement and
attention to specific employee concerns which only bargaining at a
lower level can provide. It would require much more coordination
on the part of both employers and unions than unitary bargaining,
but the benefits to both sides are considerable and are the stuff of
which labor-management dreams are made: greater productivity
for the employer and a satisfying perception of increased self-deter-
mination in the workplace by employees. 101
Another area where the Board should not shrink from exercis-
ing its authority is where the unit proposed by both the employer
100. Albeit one whose own employees are forbidden by law to unionize. See Offo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(5) (Page 1984).
101. See Perry & Angle, supra note 9, at 47-50.
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and employee representative is an illegal or otherwise utterly inap-
propriate one. If the parties are happy with a particular formula-
tion, why not let it be, you may ask. Is it not the purpose of the
statute to encourage labor-management cooperation? Why not let
the parties determine their own unit if there are no objections from
anyone?
There are two responses to this argument. The first is that the
SERB is entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the statute as
enacted. Presumably the legislature had good reason for exempting
certain employees from the coverage of the Act and for prohibiting
certain combinations of employees in the same bargaining unit. It is
simply inappropriate for the SERB to allow an employer and union
to evade the express terms of the statute voluntarily; the Board's
role is to facilitate collective bargaining between public employers
and their employees, but equally it is to guard the public interest in
appropriate unit determinations. The public may ultimately suffer
from interruptions in the provision of public services as a result of
improper unit certifications. Employees who are unfamiliar with
the certification procedures may also require the Board's interven-
tion to protect their right to object.
Second, while a particular unit configuration may present no
real problems in an individual case, the Board risks establishing a
harmful precedent when it permits an inappropriate unit to be certi-
fied. Some unit determinations, like the recent statewide bargaining
units, are established by a procedure much like rulemaking, but
most units will be approved on an individual case-by-case basis.1"2
Although the Board's unit determinations are supposedly nonre-
viewable, 103 it will nonetheless undermine its own authority and
prestige if it permits even the appearance of subjective or non-
principled decisionmaking, which would surely happen if it allowed
the parties unfettered license in constructing their own units.
102. Cf In re Florida, PuB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) (Fla. PERC June 17,
1976), reprinted in H. EDWARDS, R. CLARx, JR. & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PumLIC SECTOR 184 (1979) (Since the Florida PERC was part-time and unit determina-
tions under the Florida statute required much time and because of the difficulty in providing
PERC decisions to all affected parties, the PERC considered it "expeditious, economical, and
administratively feasible" for the State of Florida to determine the general type and kind of
units appropriate under their state employees collective bargaining act).
103. Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(A) (Page 1984); see infra notes 115-20 and ac-
companying text.
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B. Grandfathers, Orphans, and Stepchildren. Mandatory
Limitations on Unit Configuration
While the Board's application of its discretionary criteria could
lead to too few units, so too, the number and types of statutorily-
mandated restrictions could lead to other problems: too many
units, the effective denial to some employees of their statutory right
to organize and bargain collectively, and a patchwork of centralized
and decentralized units. While this result may be inevitable in some
cases because of the mandatory application of the terms of the stat-
ute, in others the Board may be able to exercise discretion in such a
way as to minimize these adverse effects.
The first problem area is the grandfather clause in the statute,
which permits-indeed, requires-continued recognition of existing
bargaining units."l 4 This has the advantage of providing continuity.
Most existing units, however, will have been established on depart-
mental lines, not on the more centralized occupational lines sug-
gested by the overfragmentation criterion in the statute.'05 The
existing vertical unit may cut across several more appropriate occu-
pational units. If left in place, the existing unit would have to be
carved out of a more desirable broader unit and dealt with sepa-
rately by the employer, requiring coordination between units to ac-
complish uniformity of treatment and making it difficult to achieve
the administrative goals which underly the centralized unit ap-
proach. Given the number of existing bargaining relationships in
place at the time the Ohio statute became effective, this problem
could be serious, depending on what possible solutions the statute
offers.
There appears to be no direct way for either an employer or the
SERB to challenge such a unit configuration, even at the end of the
existing collective bargaining agreement.' 06 Section 4117.07 pro-
vides for employers to initiate an election only in response to a re-
quest for recognition from one or more unions. In this case, where
the union has already been recognized, there is no petition which
the employer can file.' 0 7 The SERB has no independent authority
to initiate alternate bargaining unit proceedings; it can act only in
response to an appropriate petition from an employee or group of
104. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(B) (Page 1984).
105. See id. § 4117.06(B).
106. See id § 4117.07(B)(6).
107. See id § 4117.07(A). This is one area in which the Ohio statute is somewhat odd, in
that there appears to be no way in which an employer can initiate a decertification petition.
Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.607(ii) (Purdon 1983).
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employees, an employee representative, or an employer.108 The
only opportunity for redefining the bargaining unit is at the end of
any existing contract, when an employee or rival union may file a
petition for election (essentially a decertification election) on the ba-
sis that the certified union has lost its status as majority representa-
tive of the employees.109
If there is no provision for unit redefinition in the statute, as
appears to be the case, then reshaping of units can occur only as a
result of voluntary negotiations between the employer and the ex-
isting representative. In practical and political terms, that is most
likely to happen when the existing union perceives some gain to be
made by redefining the unit--control over a larger unit, for exam-
ple, or defining out of the unit a particularly fractious minority
group of employees. There may be a role for the SERB to play
here, encouraging and facilitating such negotiations where they are
appropriate. The SERB can also use its influence to guide the par-
ties to multi-unit bargaining, which is explicitly approved in the
statute, 110 and which is one way of minimizing the adverse effects of
unit fragmentation. Otherwise, the problem of intersecting vertical
and horizontal units is likely to cause problems for some time yet to
come.
The grandfather clause in the statute is not the only one which
presents unit determination problems. Several other clauses also
yield anomalous results when measured against the dual goals of the
statute, employee choice and administrative convenience for the
employer. Specifically, certain employees who are permitted by the
Act to organize and bargain collectively may find themselves shut
out of effective representation rights by mandatory unit configura-
tions which separate them from the majority of their fellow work-
ers. As one example, consider the case of non-officer employees in
police and fire departments, such as clerks, secretaries, and mainte-
nance employees. By law, they are not permitted to be included in
the same unit as the officers." 1' In smaller departments, there may
only be a handful of such employees, who are unable to form an
effective employee organization and are essentially denied a right to
108. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A) (Page 1984).
109. Id § 4117.07(A)1). Presumably the language permitting the filing of a decertifica-
tion petition by "any individual... acting in [the employees'] behalf" could be used to
permit an employer to file such a petition, but since the statute does not specifically include
the employer, such an interpretation would seem to be inconsistent with the legislative intent.
110. Id § 4117.06(D)(6).
111. Id § 4117.06(D)(3).
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organize, even though the officers with whom they work may be
unionized. The same could happen in police departments with the
sergeant and lieutenant units permitted by the statute.112 Although
the statute prohibits these employees being placed in the same bar-
gaining unit with officers, there is nothing to prevent the employer
from voluntarily recognizing a sort of mini-unit and engaging in
coordinated bargaining with all employees; indeed, the statute
states, in section 4117.03(C) that: "Nothing. . . prohibits public
employers from electing to engage in collective bargaining, meet
and confer, discussions, or any other form of collective negotiations
with public employees who are not subject to [the Act]."' 13 Thus,
the employer who is concerned about fragmentation arising as a re-
sult of mandated unit separations in the statute can effectively avoid
the problem through voluntary recognition and negotiations, in-
cluding even some employees who have no explicit statutory right
to unionize.
C. Finality of Unit Determinations
Section 4117.06(A) provides that the Board's unit determination
in any case "is final and conclusive and not appealable to the
court."' 14 This appears to be the end, but is it? And is such a rule
appropriate in all cases? The theory underlying rules like this is
that the representation process should not be delayed by appeals
which employers may file precisely for that purpose and not because
there is any real dispute about the appropriate unit; delay is one of
the most effective tactics an employer can use to fight a unionization
campaign in the workplace.'" Thus, in both the private sector and
in many public sector collective bargaining statutes, unit determina-
tions are nonappealable." 6 An alternate rationale to the delay ar-
gument is that there is no final decision of the Board to appeal until
112. Id § 4117.06(D)(6).
113. Id § 4117.03(C).
114. Id §4117.06(A).
115. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'Rights to Self Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1795-1803 (1983).
116. For an example of a nonappealable bargaining unit determination in the public sec-
tor, see Lincoln County Mem. Hosp. v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 549 S.W.2d 665
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977). In the leading private sector case, American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB,
308 U.S. 401 (1940), the United States Supreme Court, recognizing the possibility of the
employer using the appeal of a unit determination as a dilatory tactic, held that Congress did
not intend for such determinations to be final reviewable orders of the board. In Baire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964), the Court specified that appeal of unit certification
should be limited to extraordinary circumstances where the board has clearly acted in excess
of its statutory powers.
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a union has been certified: in the union election, the employees may
opt to remain nonunionized, and the whole issue becomes moot. It
would be a waste of public resources, the argument runs, to review
unit determinations until after the election. 117 As any student of
labor law knows, however, nonappealability is partly a fiction: an
employer who is unhappy with a unit determination-or one who
simply wishes to frustrate the union campaign-can refuse to bar-
gain with the union after it has been certified. This forces the union
to file an unfair labor practice charge, which results in the issuance
of a bargaining order. The employer can challenge the unit deter-
mination during a subsequent appeal of the bargaining order to a
reviewing court."18
The motivation behind the nonappealability statutes-to avoid
delay and conserve public resources-is admirable, but the ap-
proach is somewhat misguided, because it fails to account for two
distinct types of challenges to the unit determination. While it is
true that some employers may attempt to use the unit determination
process as a means of foiling unionization, unit determinations also
affect the ability of interested unions to conduct effective organiza-
tion campaigns. The inclusion or exclusion of certain employees
may mean that a particular union will be unable to muster the req-
uisite showing of interest to appear on the election ballot or will lose
majority support because the Board has ordered a larger unit or
different mix of employees in the unit than that which the union
originally proposed. The indirect route to challenge unit determi-
nations is usually only available to the disaffected employer, and not
to unions whose right to participate in the election may have been
effectively foreclosed by the Board's unit determination." 9 Argua-
117. See Lincoln County Mem. Hosp., 549 S.W.2d at 669.
118. At this point in the organization-negotiation process, the union has been certified
and there is nothing more that the employer can do to prevent unionization short of appeal-
ing the propriety of each of the preceding steps, including the showing of interest, the bar-
gaining unit determination, the union's conduct during the election campaign, and the
issuance of an interlocutory order, there is nothing to preclude the review of the correctness of
the unit determination when the parties are making final use of the machinery of the Board.
119. In Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 31 A.D.2d 325, 297 N.Y.S.2d 813, affid
per curiam, 24 N.Y.2d 993, 250 N.E.2d 230, 302 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1969) [hereinafter CSEA],
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that to prevent the effective
foreclosure of the employees' bargaining rights under the applicable New York statute, im-
mediate review of the bargaining unit determination by the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB) was appropriate in the absence of a clear statutory prohibition. Id. at 329, 297
N.Y.S.2d at 817. The court reasoned that under the facts of CSEA, the possibility of delay
was greater if the PERB's unit determinations were later found on appeal to be inappropriate,
since this would necessitate the inefficient and expensive process of redetermining the appro-
priate units and holding another set of elections. Id. Since the Board's decision was a final
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bly, it is these alternative unions that have been left out in the cold
which have the best claim to appealing the unit determination.
Since their rights have been finally determined as a result of the unit
decision, it seems unfair to penalize them with a rule originally
designed to counteract employer resistance to unionization.
In some jurisdictions, most notably New York, this anomalous
situation has been dealt with by permitting affected public sector
unions but not employers to appeal unit determinations, sometimes
in a special expedited procedure. 20 And there does not seem to
have been an adverse effect on unionization in those states which
have adopted such a policy. Because the prohibition in Ohio is
written into the statute, it is unlikely that the SERB can properly
adopt a more lenient approach to the finality of its unit determina-
tions. The best solution would be an amendment to the statute, but
until that happens, the Board must remain sensitive to the implica-
tions of its unit decisions-not just on whether the employees will
be able to exercise free choice in deciding whether to be unionized,
but also on which unions will appear on the ballot.
IV. CONCLUSION
As should be clear by now, there is, in my opinion, no single
optimum unit size; rather, there are a number of considerations
which must be taken into account in determining appropriate bar-
gaining unit configurations in specific circumstances. Even after a
year's experience with the law, public employers and employees in
Ohio, as well as the SERB itself, still stand at the beginning of their
journey toward collective bargaining in government employment.
The statute itself is well-conceived and well-drafted; it provides all
the tools necessary for the parties to develop sophisticated bargain-
ing relationships. Whether they will actually do so remains to be
seen. Bargaining unit determinations will be one of the first tests for
everyone involved in the unionization process. The statewide units
recently formulated indicate a positive and cooperative attitude on
the part of employers and employee representatives, as well as an
assertive stance by the State Employment Relations Board. To con-
rejection of the bargaining unit proposed by the state committee, the court held that this
constituted final, reviewable action. Id at 330, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
120. The New York Supreme Court in CSEA followed the general federal rule that unit
determinations are not appealable but went on to hold that in extraordinary circumstances
review of the unit determination might be obtained. Id in those extraordinary circumstances
the policy of avoiding delay is effectuated by allowing review just as that same policy is
effectuated in most other cases by postponing review until a later time.
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tinue the development process, however, the parties must remain
sensitive to the more subtle implications of bargaining unit determi-
nations, especially the delicate balance which must be drawn be-
tween employee choice and employer convenience, to ensure that
public employees will be able to exercise their right to bargaining
consonant with the efficient provision of government services.
